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Abstract:  Some major policy changes towards a more open trade and investment regime 
occurred in Indonesia during the 1980s and 1990s.  The impact of these policy changes on the 
country’s industrialisation has been generally favourable.  However, little is known about the 
impact on the dynamics of plant in the country’s manufacturing.  This study addresses this 
subject, examining the extent and determinants of plant entry in Indonesian manufacturing over 
the period 1993-96, and asking how the policy reforms affected plant entry.  The key finding 
suggests that the policy reforms increased the extent of competition within industry.  This, 
however, does not seem to be very strong, and the study puts forward some possible 
explanations.  The discussion reaches a consensus that maybe, during the period under this 
study, the process of the reform had not really been completed and, at the same time, the 
(predicted) positive impact of the liberalisation had not been fully realised. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Some major policy changes towards a more open trade and investment regime 
occurred in Indonesia for about a decade over the late 1980s and early 1990s, in 
response to various events experienced by the Indonesian economy.  After about 15 
years of an import substitution policy, sheltered by large oil revenues, the policy 
direction shifted dramatically towards outward orientation.  The policy changes took 
place in a series of bold and comprehensive reforms aimed at liberalising the economy, 
increasing investment and promoting exports. 
The impact of the policy changes on industrialisation is apparent.  The Indonesian 
manufacturing sector transformed rapidly during this time and had become an important 
source of growth by the mid 1990s.  The share of the sector in GDP increased from 12 
per cent in 1975 to 24 per cent in 1995, manufacturing exports increased substantially in 
the 1990s, and there was also an increase in foreign participation over the reform 
period.1
The rest of this paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 briefly reviews the policy 
reforms in that occurred in the decade of 1980s and 1990s.  Section 3 describes the 
impact of the policy reforms on the extent of plant entry over the period 1993-96. 
Section 4 briefly reviews some theoretical consideration on the determinants of 
plant/firm entry, which provides some basis for the econometric component of the study.  
Section 5 presents the hypotheses.  Section 6 describes the statistical framework and 
 
Notwithstanding the favourable industry performance, little is known about the 
impact of the policy reforms on the dynamics of plant in Indonesian manufacturing. 
This study addresses this subject, by examining the extent and determinants of plant 
entry in the Indonesian manufacturing sector over the period 1993-96.  It addresses the 
question of how the reforms affected the entry of plants, the importance of the reforms 
in determining the extent of the entry, and the role of other industry-level factors – if 
any – in explaining the level of entry over the period. 
                                                 
1  See Hill (1996) for a presentation of the favourable Indonesian manufacturing performance during 
the 1990s.  
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variable measurements used in the econometric exercise, and section 7 present the 
results of the exercise.  Section 8 summarises and concludes the findings of the study. 
 
 
2. Policy Changes Affecting the Manufacturing Sector  
during the 1980s and 1990s 
 
The key policy direction governing the Indonesian manufacturing since early 
1970s to mid of 1980s had been an import substitution strategy.  Within this period, the 
government implemented tariff and non-tariff barriers (NTB) to support the strategy. 
According to Thee (1994), tariffs were implemented to support the earlier stage of 
import substitution which focused on the downstream industries (i.e. final consumer 
goods) and NTB were used to support the second stage of import substitution, which 
focused on upstream industries (i.e. intermediate and capital goods).  As in other 
developing countries, this policy had a ‘cascading effect’, which sets higher tariff rates 
for consumer goods compared to intermediate and capital goods (Ariff and Hill 1985). 
The government implemented a wide range of measures.  The most significant 
were the restrictions on foreign investment and imports.  In 1973 the government 
established the Investment Coordinating Board (Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal, 
BKPM). The board was given discretionary authority to approve both foreign and 
domestic investment.  BKPM published an annual Priority Investment List that detailed 
the economic sectors in which investment was allowed, for both domestic and foreign 
investors.  The number of industries that were closed to foreign investors continuously 
increased during this import-substitution period. 
Despite the inward orientation of the industrial strategy, some reforms were 
introduced in the early 1980s in response to falling oil and commodity prices.  
Exchange rate devaluation and banking sector deregulation were undertaken.  The latter 
included removal of the interest rate ceiling, the credit ceiling and a reduction in 
liquidity credits.  Apart from the macroeconomic and financial sector reforms, the 
government also introduced tax and trade reforms during this period. 
Two other major trade reforms were undertaken in 1985.  The first was the 
rationalisation of tariffs, in the form of an across-the-board reduction in the range and 
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level of nominal tariffs.  The range of tariffs was reduced from an initial 0-225 % to 0-
60 %, with most tariffs ranging from 5-35 %.  The second reform was the improvement 
of customs and port procedures.  All operations relating to import and export goods by 
the customs department were handed over to private companies.  
The continuing threat of falling oil prices between 1982 and 1986 forced the 
government to initiate an export promotion policy objective.  The government reacted 
quickly by devaluating the Rupiah by a massive 45 per cent in 1983, while at the same 
time controlling inflation using monetary and fiscal policies.  In addition, a series of 
deregulation packages aiming to liberalise trade and investment regimes, and the 
financial sector, were introduced.  
For trade liberalisation, bold measures were taken to reduce the export bias. 
Included in these were measures to reduce the costs of exports and to increase the flow 
of investment.  In May 1986, a new and improved duty drawback scheme was 
introduced.  Unlike the old system, this scheme allowed exporters to source imported 
input at international prices and exempted them from all duties and regulation on 
imported inputs.  Moreover, the scheme also allowed exporters to import directly 
without having to deal with import licensing.  
The measures to reduce protection included the reduction of the general level of 
tariffs and the removal of many NTBs.  These were undertaken in a series of 
deregulation packages from 1987 to 1997 before the 1997/98 crisis.  The NTB removal 
was done by transforming them to equivalent tariffs and export taxes.  One example was 
the removal of the import monopoly on plastics.  Before the reform, the right to import 
plastic raw materials had been awarded to a single government trading company, which 
then appointed a sole agent from a well-connected group.  All of the imports had to be 
undertaken by the agent, who charged a fee and took a longer time to deliver the goods 
than would have happened if they had been imported directly. 
Concerning the liberalisation in the investment regime, equity restriction and 
divestment rules were gradually removed in a series of deregulations between 1986 and 
1995.  
As noted by some (e.g. Hill 1996; Pangestu 1996), policy governing foreign direct 
investment (FDI) before mid 1980s was very restricted, reflecting the conflict between 
establishing foreign links to accelerate industrialisation and some possible ‘foreign 
4 
domination’ resulting from such links.  Essentially, the perception at that time was 
foreign investment supplements domestic investment.  All these were translated into 
some restrictive provisions in laws and/or regulations governing direct investment 
before mid 1980s, and these are reflected in the following characteristics of 
multinational operation during that time (Pangestu 1996): 
i. Multinationals operation are restricted in only some sectors of the economy; 
ii. Multinationals are subject to many operating licences and strictly controlled in 
accessing domestic capital market; 
iii. Multinationals are not entitled to benefit of the government incentive programs; 
iv. Multinationals are subject to some specific regulations in regard to minimum 
capital requirement, minimum share of domestic ownership, and eventual 
transfer of the foreign share of the investment to domestic investors (i.e., the 
‘phasing-out provision’).2
As results of the restrictive policy approach, Indonesia had become substantially less 
competitive than its neighbouring countries for hosting multinationals. 
 
Significant reforms were undertaken between 1992 and 1994 to respond to the 
perceived decline in the investment climate in Indonesia (Pangestu 1996).  Several 
policy changes were important during this period.  Firstly, the obligation for foreign 
firms to establish joint ventures with Indonesian partners was relaxed. In particular, 
joint venture with a maximum of 95 percent of foreign ownership was allowed, which 
had not been the case earlier.  In addition, and more importantly, the government also 
allowed 100 percent of foreign ownership albeit this is only applied to only nine public 
sectors which are now opened for foreign investment.  Secondly, the minimum capital 
for foreign investment was reduced from about $1 million to $250,000 in 1992 and 
finally removed in 1994.  Thirdly, the government finally opened up nine sectors which 
had previously been closed for foreign investment, which are ports, electricity 
generation, telecommunications, shipping, air transport, drinking water, railway, 
automatic generation plants, and mass media. 
                                                 
2  As stated in Pangestu (1996), the minimum capital requirement for FDI was set to be $1 million 
based on the 1967 Investment Law.  Meanwhile, the phasing-out provision, as defined in the Law, 
requires that foreign investors must transfer their shares to Indonesian investors in a certain period of 
time after a (generally 30 years), otherwise the company is subject to mandatory liquidation. 
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Fourthly, the obligation to divest the majority of capital over a certain period of 
time was substantially relaxed.  The divestment rule for a joint-venture with at least 5 
percent domestic ownership is not longer mandatory, and the divestment decision is left 
to shareholders.  Meanwhile, for companies with 100 percent of foreign ownership, 
there is still phasing-out provision, but it is relaxed significantly, and that is, the amount 
of the divested investment is not officially ruled and left to the investors’ decision. 
Lastly, the provision governing the foreign investment license was made greatly less 
restrictive.  The 30-years of license is now automatically be renewed as long as the 
Investment Board acknowledges that the investment brings positive benefit for the 
economic development in general.  Earlier, under the 1967 Investment Law, the 30-
years license is non-renewable, and at the end of 30-years limit, foreign ownership must 
all be transferred to domestic investors, or else the company will be mandatory 
liquidated.  
The government introduced a major financial sector reform in 1988, which 
principally removed entry restrictions for new banks.  Foreign banks could enter 
Indonesia as joint ventures, with equity up to 85 % and without any product or 
geographical restrictions.  As a result of this reform, the banking sector boomed and 
funds available to firms were greatly increased.  
Although economic reforms supporting export orientation were the dominant 
feature of policy changes between 1985 and 1995, there were remaining regulations that 
preserved the protectionist industrial policy.  Some sectors remained closed to foreign 
investors and untouched by the reforms.  In terms of NTBs, some industries continued 
to be assisted by restrictive licensing, administratively determined local-content 
requirements, restrictive marketing arrangements and export taxes (WTO 1998).  
 
 
3. Plant Entry over the Period 1993-96  
 
3.1.  Key Hypothesis 
This section attempts to gauge the impact of the policy reforms described in the 
previous section on the extent of plant entry over the 1993-96 period.  Before presenting 
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the description, it is useful to seek some guidance from theory on the likely impact of 
the policy reforms.  
Theory, unfortunately, does not give a clear-cut prediction of this impact.  On the 
one hand, the change towards a more open trade and investment regime could increase 
plant/firm entry, and this is for the reason of the profit expected by potential entrants. 
The classical firm entry model of Orr (1974) postulates that entry occurs as long as 
there is a positive difference between the expected – or short-run – profits and the long-
run – or competitive-level – profits.  
On the other hand, a more open trade and investment regime could deter entry.  
This prediction comes, however, as a potential ‘second-round’ effect of the increased 
extent of entry due to an exposure of the expected profits of the potential entrants.  The 
rationale for this entry-deterrence effect comes from theories on the relationship 
between collusive behaviour and business cycles.  These are, in particular, the models 
put forwards Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1992), 
which hypothesise that the likelihood of collusion break-down is small when demand is 
low.  The firm that lowers its price relative to another is not likely to capture a large 
portion of the market since the market price has already been lowered.  Meanwhile, 
“punishment” from the deviation could be large if the demand resumes to its normal 
state.  The benefit from deviating may be exceeded by its costs.  Thus, based on these 
models, because expected profits would be likely to attract entry, the incumbents should 
predict a fall in demand – since the entry increases the number of firms in the industry – 
and when this happens, incumbents could increase the extent of their collusive 
behaviour, hence deterring entry.  
 
3.2.  Data and Measurement of Entry 
The main data are drawn from the annual manufacturing surveys of medium- and 
large-scale establishments (Statistik Industry, or SI) from 1992 to 1996.  The surveys 
are undertaken by the Indonesian Statistics Agency (Badan Pusat Statistik, or BPS) and 
the establishments are defined as those with 20 or more employees.  The data cover a 
wide range of information on the establishments, including some basic information 
(ISIC classification, year of starting production, location), ownership (share of foreign, 
domestic and government), production (gross output, stocks, capacity utilisation, share 
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of output exported), material costs and various type of expenses, labour (head-count and 
salary and wages), capital stock and investment, and sources of investment funds. 
The sample consists of 72 manufacturing industries at the four-digit level.  The 
number of industries is smaller than the number of industries available in the data base. 
Oil and gas industries (ISIC 353 and 354) were dropped because they are largely 
monopoly state-owned companies.  Some other industries were also dropped because of 
the difficulty in matching the ISIC code with SITC (the classification used in trade 
statistics) and because of the unavailability of average tariff rates.  Despite these 
eliminations, the sample still represents a large variety of industries in Indonesian 
manufacturing. 
It is worth mentioning here that in its first draft, this study considered the other 
period of data, namely the period post the 1997/98 economic crisis.  The inclusion of 
this period should have been very useful in the context of this study, owing to the 
accelerated trade and investment reforms during the crisis period (1997-2000).  A close 
examination of the data for this period, as well as many econometric experiments using 
the period’s data, however, revealed a major weakness of the data, which results in 
unreliable results.  The examination indicates that the number of observations (i.e., 
plants) for the period is significantly under-enumerated, resulting in a continuously 
declining plant entry rate over the period 2001-05.  While the declining entry could 
reflect the real-world situation (i.e., plant entry does not seem to recover post the crisis), 
it could also be the result of statistical error, in the form of under numerated 
observations.  The latter seems to have some support based on the most recent data 
published by BPS, the SI data of 2006, whereby the number of plants enumerated in this 
data set jump by about 30 per cent of the average number of the plants over the 2001-05 
period.  Because the 2006 data were only very recently available to the author, the 
assessment of the data, and, therefore, the assessment of the entry for the post crisis 
period are not covered in this study.   
As commonly adopted in other research (e.g. Davis et al. 1996), this study defines 
entry rate in terms of the number of plants and employment.  The entry rate in terms of 
number of plants is labelled as 1EN , while the entry rate in terms of employment is 
labelled as 2EN .  1EN  for industry j  between t  and 1−t  is defined as 
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where: ,_ j tEMPL EN  = total employment of plants that enter industry j  between t  
and 1−t , 
, 1_ j tEMPL T −  = total employment of plants in industry j  in 1−t . 
As applied in some other studies, this study also includes the measurement of entry 
in terms of output, as another alternative measure of entry in addition to measurement in 
terms of employment. Entry rate in terms of output is labelled as EN3, for industry j  
between t  and 1−t , it is defined as  
1,
,
, _
_
3
−
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where: tjENVA ,_   = total value added of plants that enter industry j  between t  and 
1−t  
1,_ −tjTVA  =  total value added of plants in industry j  in year 1−t   
 
Here, plants’ value added is adopted as the basis for computing the entrants’ output, 
instead of plants’ output.  This approach is adopted to avoid the ‘double-counting’ issue 
in computing output at aggregated industry level. 
There are different types of entry.  Within the entry category, entry can occur 
through acquisition of the established production units or creation of new ones 
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(greenfield entry).  There is a substantial difference in the effect of these types of entry. 
A greenfield entry affects industry's supply directly and immediately, while it is not 
clear whether or not the effects of acquisition entry are immediate (Baldwin 1998).  
This difference would, ideally, lead to separation of the analysis according to each type 
of entry.  The separation, however, cannot be done, because the information needed (i.e. 
the reasons for firms entry and exit) is unavailable.  Consequently, this study assumes 
that the entry is greenfield entry. 
 
3.3.  The Impact of the Trade and Investment Reforms on Plant Entry  
over the Period 1993-96 
Figures 1 shows the extent of plant entry in terms of number of plants and 
employment, respectively.  It seems to suggest a positive impact on the extent of plant 
entry resulting from the trade and investment policy reforms undertaken by the 
government during the 1980s and early 1990s.  The entry rate (EN1) increased 
substantially over the four years from 1993; as described in Section 2, the early 1990s 
was the period when the government implemented bold liberalisation measures on the 
trade and investment policy front.  The entry rate peaked in 1995, and it was very high, 
reaching almost about 20 %, which was about twice the rate in 1993.  
 
Figure 1.  Entry Rate in the Indonesian Manufacturing (%), 1993-96 
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A quite different picture, however, is shown when the entry rate is measured in 
terms of employment, and that is, that the extent of entry had moved up and down over 
the period.  It declined in 1994, increased in 1995, but declined again in 1996.  
Therefore, the indication from Figure 1 of a positive impact does not seem to have been 
quite robust.  
It is worth mentioning here that the difference between EN1 and EN2 is quite high. 
This indicates that many of the entries over this period were of relatively small plants. 
While this indication might not be favourable in terms of industrialisation – because 
large plants tend to perform better than smaller ones, due to the advantage arising from 
economies of scale – it is consistent with the general characteristics of entry drawn from 
empirical studies of entry in other countries. 
Figure 2 (a) to (h), which show the entry rate (in terms of number of plants) for the 
period by broad industry group, and the trend in the nominal tariff rate over the 1990-96 
period, provide a more detailed picture of the effect of the reforms on the extent of plant 
entry.  Here, as the key observation, however, the comparison of the rate of entry and 
the tariff rate over the period, and across the groups, , does not seem to show a 
consistent picture of  the impact, i.e., whether it is positive or negative.  Looking at the 
comparison for the industry group of ISIC 32, 33, 34, and 35 (i.e., textile-garments, 
wood products, paper products, and chemical products, respectively), the policy reforms 
are suggested to have increased plant entry, and hence indicate a positive impact.  The 
declining trend in the tariff rate is accompanied by a pattern of increasing entry for these 
industries.  
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Figure 2.   Entry Rate (in terms of Number of Plants) in the Indonesian  
Manufacturing and Nominal Tariff Rate by Broad Industry Group, 1993-96 
a. ISIC 31 Food and beverages b. ISIC 32 Textiles and garments
c. ISIC 33 Wood products d. ISIC 34 Paper products
e. ISIC 35 Chemical, rubber, and plastics f. ISIC 36 Non-metallic minerals
g. ISIC 37 Basic metal h. ISIC 38 Machinery and transport equipment
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Legend: 
               : Entry rate (%, in terms of number of plants) 
               : Nominal tariff rate (%, simple average) 
X-axis (left)    : Entry rate 
X-axis (right)  : Nominal tariff rate 
Y-axis             : Year 
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In contrast, the comparison for the industry group of ISIC 36, 37, and 38 (i.e., non-
metallic minerals, basic metal, and machinery-and-transport equipment, respectively) 
suggests that the reforms deterred entry, and hence indicate a negative impact.  For 
these industries, the declining trend in the tariff rate is matched by either declining or 
relatively low entry rate. 
All in all, the description above indicates that indeed the reforms create some 
impact on the extent of plant entry, and this is recorded in the period covered by this 
study.  The description, however, clearly shows a varying impact, particularly in terms 
of the direction of the impact (i.e., whether it is a positive or negative impact).  Another 
variable impact is in terms of the magnitude.  In other words, there is no robust answer 
on how the reforms affected plant entry.  
Given the varying impact, few immediate questions can be asked.  These include, 
for example, did the reform really have some impact on the entry?  If indeed the reforms 
played some role in shaping plant entry in the period, in which direction were these 
reforms really affecting the entry rate?  Were they increasing, or decreasing the entry 
rate? Equally important is the question of what other factors shaped the dynamics and 
variation of entry across industries in the period.  This question assumes the importance 
of the other factors in determining entry, as suggested by the literature. 
In an attempt to find some answer to these questions, this study proceeds with an 
econometric exercise that gauges the determinants of entry over the period 1993-96.  To 
facilitate the search for answers, some variables that can be associated with the policy 
reform variables are included in the exercise.  
 
 
4.  Some Theoritical Considerations 
 
To facilitate the rest of the empirical analysis, this subsection briefly reviews the 
theoretical framework that explains firm entry. 
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4.1.  Prevailing Views about Firm Entry 
There are two major approaches to the analysis of the determinants of entry. These 
are the limit-price model and the stochastic-replacement process. 
4.1.1.  Limit Price Model 
This approach assumes entry is an equilibrating process which is attracted by, and 
serves to bid away, the excess profit.  Entry is hypothesised to occur whenever the 
expected post-entry profit exceeds the level of profit in the long run.  The approach 
adopts the concept of a limit-price model (Bain 1949), which posits that there exists a 
limit price which is low enough for incumbents to be able to deter entry.  
The extent to which the limit price deters entry is determined by two factors, 
namely the size of the market and the entrant's average costs curve.  The latter gives rise 
to a cost advantage for incumbents over new entrants who may have to pay a substantial 
fixed entry cost.  This implies the average cost curves of entrants and incumbents are 
not the same.  According to Bain (1956), the cost advantages of incumbents over 
entrants are determined mainly by economies of scale, product differentiation and some 
absolute cost advantages.  
4.1.2.  Stochastic Replacement View 
This approach considers entry as a stochastic process which does not necessarily 
respond to profit and may occur even if price equals marginal cost (Baldwin and 
Gorecki 1987).  Baldwin and Gorecki argue two situations in which profit is irrelevant 
to the entry process.  The first is related to how easily entrants can enter and capture a 
market share.  This is governed by market demand growth.  In a growing market, 
additional firms entering the market are unlikely to depress the market price.  Hence 
incumbents are less threatened by entrants and are therefore less likely to act 
aggressively.  The second is a situation where entrants simply replace some existing 
firms, even when long run profits are zero. 
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4.2.  Interdependence between Entry and Exit3
As in the limit price approach, entry takes place when profit is positive. 
Accordingly, exit should occur when profit is negative and entry andexit are expected to 
be negatively correlated.  In contrast, several studies found the correlation to be positive 
(e.g. Dunne et al. 1988; Dunne and Roberts 1991; Austin and Rosenbaum 1991; Lay 
2003).  For example, Dunne and Roberts found that entry and exit are positively 
correlated with the price-cost margin for US manufacturing, implying that higher profit 
encourages both entry and exit.  Lay documented that the correlation coefficient of 
instantaneous entry and exit for Taiwan manufacturing was positive and relatively high 
(about 0.5).  
The literature records several explanations for the positive correlation, often 
termed as “interdependence”.  Geroski (1995) argues that entry and exit seem to be part 
of an evolutionary process in which a large number of new firms displace a large 
number of existing firms without much changing the total number of firms in an 
industry.  This argument is similar to the ‘stochastic-replacement’ view of entry 
(Baldwin and Gorecki 1987) which posits that entry can still be expected even when 
industry’s profitability is zero.  Entry in this view simply replaces some existing firms. 
Shapiro and Khemani (1987) offer two reasons for the interdependence.  First, to 
the extent that cost heterogeneity exists, there might be some high-cost incumbents who 
can be displaced by low-cost entrants.  Second, to the extent that barriers to entry are 
also barriers to exit (Caves and Porter 1976; Eaton and Lipsey 1980), potential 
displacement is limited and incumbents are deterred from exiting.  The symmetrical 
relationship between entry and exit barriers arises from investments with sunk cost 
characteristics (i.e. investment in durable and specific assets).  Sunk cost creates barriers 
to entry because it represents a higher opportunity cost that has to be met by entrants, 
and higher risk owing to the large losses associated with unsuccessful entry.  At the 
same time, sunk cost also creates barriers to exit because incumbents are limited by 
inability to divest, owing to the non-recoverable nature of the assets (Shapiro and 
Khemani 1987, p.16). 
 
                                                 
3  A useful review of the interdependence is provided by Fotopoulus and Spence (1998). 
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Shapiro and Khemani’s displacement effect implies that entry is responsible for 
exit.  Fotopoulus and Spence (1998) consider that the process could be the other way 
around.  That is, exit creates room for new entry.  If the two directions hold, entry and 
exit are causally related and the interdependence may be due to some ‘displacement-
replacement’ effect. 
 
 
5.  Model Specification and Hypotheses 
 
5.1.  Model Specification 
This study follows a specification of entry model similar to those in the literature. 
An exit model is also specified for the reason that entry and exit might be causally 
related, as discussed in the previous section. Ignoring industry and time subscripts, these 
are 
),,,( 1111 REPLZYXfEN =  (1) 
),,,( 2222 DISPZYXfEX =  (2) 
where EN ( EX ) is entry (exit) rate, 1X ( 2X )  is a vector of incentives for entry (exit), 
1Y ( 2Y ) is a vector of entry (exit) barriers, 1Z  ( 2Z ) is a vector of other relevant 
variables, REPL  is replacement entry and DISP  is displacement entry.  DISP  and 
REPL  are included to represent displacement and replacement behaviour, respectively. 
As is commonly done in the literature, REPL  and DISP  are assumed to be a 
function of exit and entry, respectively. Thus, equations (1) and (2) can be expressed as 
),,,( 1111 EXZYXfEN =   (3) 
),,,( 2222 ENZYXfEX =  (4) 
Having specified displacement and replacement behaviour, the discussion now turns to 
the specification of other vectors.  Consider, first, 1X .  The specification of 1X  is 
derived from Orr’s (1974) model, which posits that entry ( E ) is expected to occur 
whenever expected post entry profits ( eπ ) are above the entry-precluding level ( *π ).  
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The entry-precluding level refers to profits which would be earned by incumbents in the 
long-run after all entry has ceased. Orr’s model is 
*)( ππ −= efE  (5) 
Adopting the concept of a limit-price model (Bain 1949 and 1956), Orr assumes *π  
depends on a vector of entry barriers ( ENB ) and market risk ( R ), that is 
),(* RENBf=π  (6) 
Substituting (6) into (5), Orr’s model becomes 
),,( RENBfE eπ=   (7) 
To incorporate the stochastic replacement view of entry, industry growth ( GR ) is added 
to equation (7).4
),,,( RENBGRfE eπ=
  So that it becomes 
  (8) 
This study uses pre-entry profitability to proxy eπ  and price-cost margin to proxy 
profitability ( 1−tPCM ).  Market risk is proxied by the variability in industry 
profitability, defined as the standard deviation of PCM  ( SDPCM ).  Following Shapiro 
and Khemani (1987), GR  is deflated by the minimum efficient scale ( MES ) to reflect a 
situation that there must be sufficient growth to justify additional capacity in an industry.  
The deflation is defined as ROOM variable.  
The use of pre-entry profitability as a proxy for eπ   has been the usual procedure 
in empirical studies.  However, the procedure is unlikely to proxy  eπ  properly.  The 
(naïve) entrants neglect the effect their entry may have on profits because profitability 
between post- and pre-entry is assumed to be the same (Geroski 1991).  Moreover, 
employing the naïve expectation may open up the possibility for incumbents to 
manipulate pre-entry profit and hence could discourage entry.  An alternative approach 
is to assume that entrants form rational expectations to make the entry decision.  The 
                                                 
4  Baldwin and Gorecki (1987) introduced market size to capture replacement entry.  This study does 
not follow this approach since replacement entry has been assumed to depend on exit. 
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rational expectation assumption leads to the procedure of forecasting profit based on an 
autoregressive model of profit.  Several studies, e.g. Highfield and Smiley (1987) and 
Jeong and Masson (1991), provide evidence that using forecasted profits performed 
better than pre-entry profits.  Although the alternative approach is more reasonable, it is 
not possible in this study because there are not enough time-series observations in the 
data base.  
Two variables are included to represent barriers to entry: economies of scale ( ES ) 
and capital requirement ( KR ).  Economies of scale acts as an entry barrier if industry 
output accounted for by minimum efficient scale ( MES ) constitutes a significant part of 
the quantity demanded at a competitive price.  Potential entrants could enter on a large 
scale but would trigger retaliation by incumbents.  Capital requirement is included to 
capture the extent of cost disadvantages faced by entrants. According to Bain (1956), 
borrowers’ lack of information about potential entrants provides incumbents with an 
absolute cost advantage over entrants, which results in difficulties for entrants in raising 
investment funds.  
Seller concentration is included in 1Y  to capture the strategic deterrence actions by 
incumbents.  These are likely to occur in the post-entry period.  Examples of these 
actions include predatory pricing, aggressive advertising campaigns and credible threats 
to compete hard against new rivals (Evans and Siegfried 1992).  However, seller 
concentration may also attract entry.  It facilitates collusion that in turn provides a 
higher survival chance given that entry has occurred. Chamberlin’s (1933) model 
predicts that once concentration levels reach a certain point, oligopolies recognise their 
interdependence and that together they produce a monopoly output for the market.  
The specification of vector 2X  in equation (4) follows earlier empirical work on 
the determinants of exit (e.g Deutsch 1984; MacDonald 1986; Shapiro and Khemani 
1987; Flynn 1990; Doi 1999) and is similar to that of vector 1X  and 1Y  in the entry 
equation.  
According to models of firm bankruptcy (e.g. Schary 1991), a firm decision to shut 
down depends on a short-term cash flow problem and assessment of long term prospects.  
Therefore, profitability ( PCM ) and industry growth ( GR ) are included in X2.    
As noted earlier, exit barriers arise from sunk costs.  The relationship between sunk 
costs and the probability of exit relates to the ‘duration’ view of sunk costs (Rosenbaum 
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and Lamort 1992, p.299).  That is, a longer production time is needed to recover 
sufficient returns from investment as the resale value of the non-recoverable assets 
cannot be added to the stream of income generated by these assets.  The implication is 
that firms with high sunk-capital costs are forced to stay in an industry longer than firms 
with low sunk-capital costs.  
Therefore, the ideal proxies for exit barriers are those that can represent the extent 
of sunk costs.  The strategy commonly applied in empirical studies is to create some 
proxies based on characteristic sunk costs, which are durability and specificity in assets. 
The only problem here is that it is often difficult to obtain such proxies as a result of the 
specificity characteristics.  Despite this, Caves and Porter (1976, p.44) argue that each 
source of entry barrier identified by Bain can also be erected as a barrier to exit.  In this 
argument, the durability and specificity of assets can to some extent be captured by 
Bain’s entry barriers.  For example, it is often argued that incumbents must have some 
resources which are at least temporarily specific to allow them to create some cost 
advantages over potential entrants.  Otherwise, potential entrants could easily duplicate 
the resources and enter.  Following Caves and Porter, 2Y  is specified to be identical to 
barriers to entry. 
4CR  is also included in 2Y . Seller concentration facilitates collusion, which could 
increase the probability of survival and hence may discourage exit.  Despite this, low 
exit rates in highly concentrated industries may also be possible simply because firms 
are likely to be the established firms (Flynn 1990).  
Vectors 1Z  and 2Z  are specified to include variables related to trade and 
international competition.  The first is foreign ownership ( FOR ).  The impact of 
concentration of foreign ownership on entry is ambiguous.  On the one hand, it could 
discourage entry, for the reason that foreign firms are usually large, and therefore, they 
tend to have economies of scale in their production, which raises some barriers to entry 
into the industry.  Moreover, a strong chance of survival for foreign firms in the 
presence of economic shocks, vis-à-vis domestic firms, implies a greater likelihood that 
foreign firms will stay in the industry in the event of an economic shock.  This, in turn, 
suggests a negative relationship to entry.  On the other hand, high concentration of 
foreign ownership in an industry could also encourage entry, and this could simply be 
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due to the signalling effect  activities “must” be highly profitable in an industry with 
such a high foreign ownership concentration. 
The second variable is export orientation ( EXP ).  The greater profit opportunities 
provided by the export market are likely to attract entry and hinder exit.  In contrast, a 
higher degree of export orientation could also discourage entry and encourage exit, 
because it signals a greater intensity of competition in the industry.  Nevertheless, the 
pressure for higher exit is likely to be weak since established firms must have paid 
substantial costs for participating in export markets.  
This study includes import penetration ( IMP ) and trade protection (TARIFF ) to 
represent the effect of international competition on entry.  At the same time, these 
variables also represent the variables that are related to, or can be associated with, the 
reforms which are the focus of this study.  It is often argued that greater trade protection 
tends to facilitate non-competitive behaviour, such as collusion, and protects less 
efficient firms.  Therefore, incumbents in a protected industry could collude and deter 
entry.  However, entry could also be encouraged because the trade protection which 
allows incumbents to behave non-competitively could also be a more important 
incentive than the profit incentive.  
Meanwhile, the effect of import competition on entry and exit is ambiguous.  
Higher import competition could be expected to reduce entry unless it widens the 
domestic market.  However, it could also encourage exit as more firms increase 
competition and reduce the survivability of incumbents.  
The other variables considered in the model aim at capturing the industry factor-
intensity ( FI ) effect.  It could be predicted that the extent of entry should be higher in 
the industries where the country has some comparative advantage .  In this study, a set 
of dummy variables representing industry factor intensity is considered, and these are 
the dummy for labour-intensive industries, resource-based but labour-intensive 
industries, resource-based but capital-intensive industries, and footloose capital-
intensive industries. 
To sum up, the entry and exit equations can be specified as follows 
( , , , , , 4, , , , , , )EN f PCM ROOM SDPCM ES KR CR FOR EXP IMP TARIFF FI EX=    (9) 
( , , , , 4, , , , , , )EX f PCM GR ES KR CR FOR EXP IMP TARIFF FI EN=                      (10) 
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The definition of the variables in these equations is given in the next section. 
 
5.2.  Hypotheses 
The following paragraphs present the hypotheses to be tested in the econometric 
exercise, based on the theoretical discussion of the previous sections. 
 
5.2.1.  Trade Protection and Import Competition 
This is the key hypotheses to be tested. Based on the brief theoretical discussion in 
Section 3.1, the effect of trade protection (TARIFF ) in attracting entry might not have 
been clear.  It could have increased entry, for the reason that lowered tariff and other 
international trade barriers reveal the positive expected profits for potential entrants. 
Lowered tariff protection, however, could have also deterred entry.  As discussed, the 
threat from potential entrants could increase the extent of collusive behaviour, which in 
turn could increase the strength of entry barriers.  This reasoning also suggests that 
higher import competition ( IMP ) could have been negatively related to entry – higher 
competition from imports could trigger or increase the extent of collusive behaviour, 
hence raising the entry barriers.  
5.2.2.  Symmetrical Relationship between Entry and Exit 
The symmetrical relationship between entry and exit might hold.  This is because, 
for any potential entrant, the opportunity cost for any new investment is likely to have 
been relatively low during the period.  As noted, there was a bold banking sector 
deregulation that increased the role of financial intermediaries in  the sector.  In addition, 
the period covered by the study was a rapidly growing period in the Indonesian 
economy, and, therefore, there should be a favourable profitability for doing business in 
this period.  Meanwhile,  for the established firms, the role of sunk costs as exit barriers 
may not have been very important, since many firms were unlikely to find themselves in 
depressing situations during this period. 
 
5.2.3.  Displacement and Replacement Entry 
Displacement entry should not have been more important. This is because 
favourable economic conditions tend to shelter the inefficient firms, helping them to 
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survive.  This situation therefore reduces the opportunity for low-cost potential entrants 
to enter and successfully compete with the incumbents.  
5.2.4.  Demand Situation 
In theory, profitability ( PCM ) and market growth ( ROOM ) are expected to have 
been important in attracting entry.  Even so, they may not have been vitally important. 
In a developing country like Indonesia, a situation that creates the expectation of a 
stable  profit – instead of the expected profit itself – could have been the determining 
factor.  It is often argued in the literature that the existence of imperfect markets, low 
levels of competition, and trade protection are the major source of this situation.  Given 
these contrasting arguments, there could have also been the conflicting effect of market 
risk ( SDPCM ) in determining entry. 
 
5.2.5.  Entry Barriers 
According to the limit-price model, economies of scale ( ES ) and capital 
requirements ( KR ) should be negatively related to entry.  
Meanwhile, the effect of strategic entry deterrence behaviour, proxied by 4CR , is 
difficult to predict a priori.  Strategic behaviour might have been positively related to 
entry (i.e. it encouraged entry), for the reason that retaliatory behaviour is unlikely to 
occur when demand is growing, which was the situation for the period covered by this 
study.  
However, as discussed earlier, there are models that predict that the probability of 
collusion is lower in a high demand situation (e.g. Rotemberg and Saloner 1986; 
Rotemberg and Woodford 1992).  This implies that the effect of industry concentration 
can be expected to have been negative. 
 
5.2.6.  Foreign Ownership 
The effect of foreign ownership ( FOR ) is also difficult to predict a priori.  As 
noted, the economies of scale effect raised by high concentrations of foreign ownership 
suggests a negative relationship, but the signal of a profitable industry that the high 
concentration provides could also result in a positive relationship.  
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5.2.7.  Export Orientation5
EXP
 
Export orientation ( ) is expected to have strongly attracted entry.  The 
reasoning is clear, and that is that higher export orientation provides higher expected 
profitability.  Export orientation, however, could also imply a higher competitive threat 
from firms in the global economy, and this could in contrast lower the expected 
profitability.  The effect of export orientation, therefore, could have also been negative. 
 
5.2.8.  Factor Intensity 
Given the comparative advantage that Indonesia has, labour-intensive industries 
are predicted to encourage more entry than any other industry, particularly the capital-
intensive industries.  
 
 
6.  Methodology  
 
6.1.  Statistical Framework 
Equations (9) and (10) form the basic equations to be estimated.  Before outlining 
the estimating equations, it is important to discuss several relevant issues.  
First, the literature does not clearly indicate whether EX  in the entry equation or 
EN  in the exit equation should enter as current or lagged variables.  Several studies, e.g. 
Austin and Rosenbaum (1991), Evans and Siegfried (1992) and Fotopoulus and Spence 
(1998), specified EX  and EN  as their current variables.  In other words, EX and EN  
are assumed to be endogenous in entry and exit equations, respectively. Other studies, 
such as Sluewagen and Dehandschutter (1991) and Lay (2003), specified EX  and EN  
as their lagged variables, treating them as weakly exogenous variables.6
                                                 
5  The inclusion of foreign ownership and factor intensity as two determinants of entry were 
motivated and suggested by a participant in the workshop of this research project. 
6 In one of their specifications Shapiro and Khemani (1987) include the lagged exit in the entry 
equation but include the current entry in the exit equation, rendering equations (3) and (4) a 
recursive system model. 
 Because the 
literature is silent on which approach is more appropriate, this study experimented with 
both. 
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Secondly, it might not be reasonable to assume the effect of profitability and 
growth in the entry equation is exactly mirrored in the exit equation.  Following 
previous studies, ROOM is assumed to have one lag structure in the entry equation 
while PCM  and GR  are assumed to have no lags in the exit equation.7
EN
  This approach 
follows Shapiro and Khemani (1987), who assume that exit responds more quickly to 
profit and growth than entry.  However, the approach does not mean the exit process is 
instantaneous. Shapiro and Khemani were aware that there are lags between the time 
when exit is considered and when it actually occurs.  The assumption simply tries to 
capture the idea that entry is likely to be a better-prepared action than exit.   
The third issue relates to the specification of entry and exit barriers.  Certain types 
of barriers are likely to be omitted from the regression based on equations (9) and (10). 
For example, Geroski (1991) noted it is difficult to measure the control of incumbents 
over some strategic resources.  Further, and as noted, specificity implied by sunk cost 
suggests many exit barriers are unlikely to be captured in the structural variables in the 
equations.  To solve this problem, fixed effects – in the form of industry dummy 
variables – are introduced into equations (9) and (10) to capture the unobserved entry 
and exit barriers.  This introduction is justified because entry and exit barriers tend to be 
constant over time, at least in the short and medium term. 
This study assumes all structural variables are exogenous.  To secure this 
assumption, lagged values are used instead of current ones.  
Finally, as entry and exit are measured in relative terms (i.e. proportion), the 
dependent variables in theory and practice are bounded between zero and one. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the sample is not drawn from a normal 
distribution and this may lead to bias and inconsistent least square estimates.  To solve 
this problem, logistic transformation on the dependent variables was carried out.  With 
 and EX  (entry and exit rates) as the observed variables, the transformations are  
)1/ln(' ENENEN −=  and 
)1/ln(' EXEXEX −= , 
                                                 
7 Rosenbaum and Lamort (1992) also adopt a similar approach.  
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where 'EN  and 'EX  are the logistic transformation of EN  and EX , respectively. 
These transformations allow the dependent variables in the regression to be drawn from 
a normal distribution and the estimations by a least squares approach.  
While useful, this transformation approach has two limitations (Wooldridge 2002, 
p.662).  First, it cannot be used when EN  and EX  take the boundary values of either 
zero or one.  As is commonly done in other cases, this study manipulated the boundary 
values by substituting the value zero with 0.1111 and value one with 0.9999.  The data 
manipulation is a common approach adopted both in general empirical studies 
(Wooldridge, 2002) and studies on firm entry (e.g. Khemani and Shapiro 1986; Mata 
1993). 
The second limitation is that the parameters are difficult to interpret.  According to 
Papke and Wooldridge (1996), further assumptions on the distribution of errors are 
needed to obtain the expected value of dependent variable conditional on the 
explanatory variables and, even with these assumptions, it is still non-trivial to obtain 
the expected value.  Notwithstanding this limitation, this study proceeds with the 
transformation approach, because the focus here is on the change in the effect of the 
explanatory variables between two periods of time rather than on the magnitude of the 
effect. 
The discussion has established two pairs of estimating entry and exit equations, 
specified as follows:  
 
Model I: 
+++++= −−−−− 1,51,41,31,21,1,' tjtjtjtjtjtj KRESSDPCMROOMPCMEN ααααα  
             6 , 1 7 , 1 8 , 1 9 , 14 j t j t j t j tCR EXP IMP TARIFFα α α α− − − −+ + + +  
             10 , 1 ,j t j j tEXα α µ− + +                                                                                         (11) 
 
, 1 , 2 , 3 , 1 4 , 1 5 , 1 6 , 1' 4j t j t j t j t j t j t j tEX PCM GR ES KR CR EXPβ β β β β β− − − −= + + + + + +  
              7 , 1 8 , 1 9 , 1 ,j t j t j t j j tIMP TARIFF ENβ β β β ε− − −+ + + +                                             (12) 
 
Model II: 
+++++= −−−−− 1,51,41,31,21,1,' tjtjtjtjtjtj KRESSDPCMROOMPCMEN ααααα  
             6 , 1 7 , 1 8 , 1 9 , 14 j t j t j t j tCR EXP IMP TARIFFα α α α− − − −+ + + +  
             10 , ,j t j j tEXα α µ+ +                                                                                      (13) 
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, 1 , 2 , 3 , 1 4 , 1 5 , 1 6 , 1' 4j t j t j t j t j t j t j tEX PCM GR ES KR CR EXPβ β β β β β− − − −= + + + + + +  
              7 , 1 8 , 1 9 , ,j t j t j t j j tIMP TARIFF ENβ β β β ε− −+ + + +                           (14) 
 
where,  t     = 1994, 1995, 1996  
 j            = industry j 
'EN       = logistic transformation of the entry rate  
 'EX       = logistic transformation of the exit rate  
 EN        = the entry rate  
 EX        = the exit rate 
 PCM     = price-cost margin 
 ROOM  = industry room  
 GR         = annual industry growth  
 SDPCM  = standard deviation of PCM  
 EOS       = economies of scale  
 KR         = capital requirement  
 4CR       = seller concentration  
 EXP       = export intensity  
 IMP       = import penetration  
 TARIFF  = trade protection 
 jα , jβ     = industry fixed effect of industry j 
          
Model I and II are different in the way right-hand-side EX and EN  are specified.  
The equations in Model I were first considered as independent, assuming no 
interdependence between entry and exit, and estimated by OLS.  Next, the equations 
were estimated by the SURE method to account for the interdependence.  The SURE 
method is considered because it is able to take into account the non-zero 
contemporaneous correlation in the error terms between the two equations.  The 
equations in Model II were estimated by the 2SLS method.  This is because tjEN ,  and 
tjEX ,  can be thought to be determined simultaneously.  
 
6.2.  Measurement of Variables 
 
6.2.1.  Dependent Variables (Entry and Exit Rates) 
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The entry rates have been presented earlier.  As for the exit rates, this study adopts 
two exit rate measures, in terms of number of plants, employment and value added, 
labelled as 1EX  , 2EX , and 3EX , respectively.   
1EX  for industry j  between t  and 1−t  is defined as  
1,
,
,1
−
=
tj
tj
tj NTP
NXP
EX  , 
where: tjNXP ,   = total number of plants that exit industry j between t and 1−t   
 1, −tjNTP  =  total number of plants in industry j  in year 1−t   
EX2 for industry j between t and t-1 is defined as 
,
,
, 1
_
2
_
j t
j t
j t
EMPL EX
EX
EMPL T −
=  , 
where: ,_ j tEMPL EX  = total employment of plants that exit industry between  
             t and 1−t  
 , 1_ j tEMPL T −  = total employment of plants in industry j  in 1−t   
 
EX3 for industry j between t and t-1 is defined as 
1,
,
, _
_
3
−
=
tj
tj
tj TVA
EXVA
EX  , 
where: tjEXVA ,_   = total value added of plants that exit industry j  between t  and 
1−t  
 1,_ −tjTVA  =  total value added of plants in industry j  in year 1−t   
 
6.2.2.  Independent Variables 
All of the variables are defined for industry j , which is defined at the four digit 
level. 
 
• Price-cost margin ( PCM  ) 
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PCM is defined as the ratio of gross profit to sales, and for industry j, it is defined 
as: 
j j j
j
j
output inputs wages
PCM
output
− −
=  
Gross profit is computed as the value of output minus inputs and wages and salary. 
Included in inputs are raw material, fuel and electricity.  
• Seller concentration ( 4CR ) and Herfindahl Index ( HHI ) to proxy the extent of 
competition 
CR4 for industry j is defined as  
4
1
1
4
i
i
j n
i
i
VA
CR
VA
=
=
=
∑
∑
 
While HHI for industry j is defined as 
2
i
j
i i
VAHHI
VA
 
=   
 
∑ ∑
 
where iVA  is the value added of plant i  in industry j .  
• Import penetration ( IMP  ) 
IMP  for industry j  is defined as 
j
j
j
M
IMP
Q
=  
where jQ  and jM  are the domestic production and imports in industry j , respectively. 
• Industry growth ( GR  ) 
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GR is measured as the percentage change in real value added of industry j  between 
t  and  1−t  
, , 1
, 1
j t j t
j t
RVA RVA
GR
RVA
−
−
−
=  
where VA  is the value added of industry j .  The industry value added is deflated by the 
wholesale price index (WPI) at the three digit ISIC level.  
• Industry room ( ROOM ) 
ROOM is measured as GR  divided by .MES   MES  is defined as the average plant 
size accounting for 50 percent of industry output (Caves et al. 1975).  Plant size is 
measured by total number of workers.  
• Standard deviation of profitability ( SDPCM ) 
SDPCM  is measured by the standard deviation of PCM , defined at the three digit 
level of ISIC. 
 
• Economies of scale ( ES ) 
ES  is defined following (Caves et al. 1975) as a compound variable using MES and 
cost-disadvantages ratio (CDR), that is  
MESCDRES *)1( −=  
CDR is defined as  
largest
smallest
)/(
)/(
LVA
LVACDR =  
where smallest)/( LVA  is the value added per labour for the smallest plants accounting for 
50% of industry output and largest)/( LVA  is the value added per labour for the largest 
plants accounting for the largest 50% of industry output. 
• Capital requirement ( KR ) 
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KR is measured following Caves et al. (1980) as 
MES
Q
KKR *=  
where QK /  is the ratio of capital to labour.  In the absence of reliable capital stock 
estimates, QK /  is proxied by the ratio of energy expenditure to production labour.  
This proxy follows the approach taken by Globerman et al. (1994), which was 
motivated by some previous studies which show that capital and energy are 
complementary inputs in production.  Thus,  
MESKR *
Lprod
eexpenditurenergy 
=  
where prodL  is the number of production workers. 
 
• Export intensity ( EXP ) 
EXP  is measured as the ratio of export to industry output. 
output 
 exports
=EXP  
• Trade protection (TARIFF )  
This study uses the average nominal tariff rate to proxy .TARIFF  The data for the 
tariff rate are derived from WITS database for the period of 1994-96. 
 
 
7.  Some Descriptive Analysis and Estimation Results 
 
Before presenting and analysing the estimation results, it is useful to briefly present 
some descriptive analysis of the impact of tariff on some of the entry determinants.8
                                                 
8  The description is provided in the light of a comment made during the workshop of this research 
project. 
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Here, based on the discussion in the theoretical background, we selected some of the 
determinant variables for the description, namely price-cost margin (PCM), industry 
concentration variables (HHI), and industry export share (EXP). 
Consider, first, the impact of the declining tariff rate on price-cost margin, of 
which the picture is presented in Figure 3 for the entry rate in terms of number of plants.  
While the Figure does not seem to show any obvious pattern, the decline of tariff rate 
over the period 1990-96 seems to have increased price-cost margin in the non-metallic 
and basic metal industry (i.e., ISIC 36 and 37, respectively) and decreased the price-cost 
margin in textile-and-garments, paper products, chemical products, and transport-and-
machinery equipments (i.e., ISIC 32, 34, 35, and 38, respectively).  
The decline in price-cost margin, along with the declining trend in the tariff rate, 
indicates an increase in the extent of competition from a more open economy.  As for 
the increase in the price-cost margin, however, it suggests two scenarios.  Either there is  
still a substantial market opportunity that had not been explored until the industry 
experienced the decline in the tariff rate, or some firms in the industries  engaged in 
some collusive behaviour which could be triggered by more open industries.  The 
pictures based on entry rate in terms of employment and output, which are not shown 
here, also deliver the same message, and in fact show very similar pictures across the 
industry groups.  
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Figure 3.  Entry Rate (in terms of the Number of Plants) and Price-cost Margin  
  (PCM) in the Indonesian  Manufacturing and Nominal Tariff Rate,  
by Broad Industry Group, 1993-96 
a. ISIC 31 Food and beverages b. ISIC 32 Textiles and garments
c. ISIC 33 Wood products d. ISIC 34 Paper products
e. ISIC 35 Chemical, rubber, and plastics f. ISIC 36 Non-metallic minerals
g. ISIC 37 Basic metal h. ISIC 38 Machinery and transport equipment
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Legend: 
              : PCM (%, simple average)                         
              : Entry Rate (%, in terms of the number of plants)  
: Nominal Tariff Rate (%, simple average)     
X-axis              : Year 
Y1-axis (left)     : Entry Rate, PCM 
Y2-axis (right)   : Nominal Tariff Rate 
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Turning to the impact of the declining tariff rate on the seller concentration, as 
noted in Figure 4 for the HHI measure of the concentration and entry rate in terms of 
number of plants, again there is a mixed picture and no clear pattern for the impact.  The 
Herfindahl Indexes for the food-and-beverage, basic metals, and transport-and-
machinery equipment industries (i.e., ISIC 31, 37, and 38) show an increase in the Index 
over the period 1994-96.  This is in contrast to the decline in the Index for the textile-
and-garments, paper products, non-metallic minerals, and transport-and-machinery 
equipment industries.  At the experimental stage, some graphs for CR4 were also 
derived and show similar results, although they were not as robust as those produced by 
the Herfindahl Index.  
Figure 4 gives the message that for industries experiencing an increase in seller 
concentration over the period – and at the same time looking at the trend in the tariff 
rate – there is a possibility that the extent of collusive behaviour, or the motivation for it, 
in these industries could have been wiped out by the more open industries, indicated by 
the declining trend of the tariff rate.  Using the same rationale, it is suggested that the 
extent of or motivation for collusive behaviour could have strengthened in some 
industries that experienced an increasing trend in seller concentration.  The two 
contrasting possibilities are consistent with the previous graph on the impact of the 
declining tariff rate on price-cost margin.  Although they are not shown here, the 
inference drawn from the picture of the impact when using entry rate in terms of 
employment and output is the same. 
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Figure 4.  Entry Rate (in Terms of the Number of Plants) and Herfindahl Index  
  (HHI) in the Indonesian  Manufacturing and Nominal Tariff Rate, 
by Broad Industry Group, 1993-96 
a. ISIC 31 Food and beverages b. ISIC 32 Textiles and garments
c. ISIC 33 Wood products d. ISIC 34 Paper products
e. ISIC 35 Chemical, rubber, and plastics f. ISIC 36 Non-metallic minerals
g. ISIC 37 Basic metal h. ISIC 38 Machinery and transport equipment
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Legend: 
            : HHI (simple average) 
             : Entry Rate (%, in terms of the number of plants) 
            : Nominal Tariff Rate (%, simple average) 
X-axis             : Year  
Y1-axis (left)    : Entry Rate, HHI 
Y2-axis (right)   : Nominal Tariff Rate 
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Figure 5 provides a picture of the impact of the declining tariff rate on industries’ 
export share.  Unlike the previous two tables, there is a clearer picture of the impact. In 
particular, the declining tariff rate is suggested to have increased the export share of 
some industries, namely textile-and-garments, wood products, chemical products, non-
metallic mineral products, and transport-and-machinery equipment.  The impact is not 
so clear in the case of the paper and basic metal industries.  
This rather solid finding suggests that trade liberalisation benefited some sectors 
substantially.  While encouraging, in terms of entry, this does not necessarily mean that 
increased exports could immediately result in an increase of the entry rate, although it is 
worth noting that the pattern in the entry rate over this short time period seems to follow 
the trend in industry export share.  In short, here the key point is that the positive impact 
of the declining tariff rate on an industry’s export share is not suggested to have fully 
‘transferred’ to an equally higher entry rate.  Thus, the increase in the export share 
should partly come from some firms that have already established themselves in the 
industry (i.e., the incumbents).  
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Figure 5. Entry Rate (in Terms of the Number of Plants) and Industry Export 
Share (EXP) in the Indonesian Manufacturing and Nominal Tariff Rate, 
by Broad Industry Group, 1993-96 
a. ISIC 31 Food and beverages b. ISIC 32 Textiles and garments
c. ISIC 33 Wood products d. ISIC 34 Paper products
e. ISIC 35 Chemical, rubber, and plastics f. ISIC 36 Non-metallic minerals
g. ISIC 37 Basic metal h. ISIC 38 Machinery and transport equipment
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Legend: 
             :  EXP (%, simple average) 
             :  Entry Rate (%, in terms of number of plants) 
   :  Nominal Tariff Rate (%, simple average) 
X-axis              :  Year 
Y1-axis (left)     :  Entry Rate, EXP 
Y2-axis (right)   :  Nominal Tariff Rate 
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7.1.  The Estimation Results 
Equations in Models I and II are estimated using entry and exit rates in terms of 
number of plants and employment (EN1, EX1, 2EN , 2EX , EN3, and EX3).  Model II 
was dropped from the analysis because the estimation results of model II using the 
2SLS method rendered almost all the variables in the equations insignificant.  Although 
this is obviously not a good result, several studies have obtained similar results (e.g. 
Shapiro and Khemani 1987; Austin and Rosenbaum 1991; Fotopoulus and Spence 
1998).  
Several industries were identified as outliers using the Hadi (1992) method.  This 
study controls the outliers by removing them from the sample.  The usual approach of 
introducing dummy variables that identifies them was not adopted because it results in a 
perfect collinearity with the fixed industry effects (the industry dummy variables).  
Table 1 presents the estimation results for Model I using the SURE method, with 
'1EN  and '1EX  as the dependent variable.9   Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) 
statistics are employed to test whether the error terms of the entry and exit equation in 
Model I are contemporaneously correlated.  The null hypothesis of equal error terms in 
the entry and exit equation is rejected at the 1 per cent significance level.10
                                                 
9  Three alternative specifications of entry were experimented with. The first was as in equations 
(11) or (13), the second was where ROOM was replaced by GR and the third was where ROOM was 
retained but ES was dropped.  The specifications are motivated by the way ROOM is generated, 
which raises possible colinearity with ES.  As presented, ES is measured as ES=(1-CDR)*MES, 
where CDR is the cost disadvantage ratio.  The experiment shows that the results did not differ 
greatly from one specification to the other.  But because the first specification performed better in 
terms of F-statistics, it was chosen as the basis for the analysis.  
10  The degree of freedom for the LM tests is one. 
  Therefore, it 
can be concluded that entry and exit in the period were correlated.  Accordingly, the 
results obtained by the SURE method provide the basis for the analysis (Table 7.4), and 
the OLS results are not reported here.  The coefficients produced by the SURE method 
are similar to those obtained by OLS and have the same signs.  However, the t-statistics 
improve in some estimated coefficients, which indicates the improvement in efficiency 
and  justifies the reference to the SURE results.  
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Table 1.  The Determinants of Entry and Exit, 1994-96: Regression Results of Model I 
 Method: SURE 
Dependent variable EN1'j,t EX1'j,t 
 (1) (2) 
PCMj,t-1 0.638   
  (1.13)   
SDPCMj,t-1 0.002   
 (0.00)   
PCMj,t   -0.581 
   (1.21) 
ROOMj,t-1 -0.139   
 (0.38)   
GRj,t   0.055 
   (0.75) 
ESj,t-1a) -0.005 -0.036 
 (0.18) (1.36) 
KRj,t-1a) 0.0185 2.811 
 (0.09) (1.50) 
CR4j,t-1 0.251 0.656 
 (0.94) (2.81)** 
FORj,t-1 -0.560 -0.283 
 (1.73)+ (0.96) 
EXPj,t-1 0.502 0.666 
 (1.95)+ (2.76)** 
IMPj,t-1 -0.018 -0.012 
 (1.88)+ (1.44) 
TARIFFj,t-1 0.014 0.002 
 (1.90)+ (0.21) 
EN1j,t-1   1.058 
   (2.42)* 
EX1j,t-1 2.888   
 (2.66)**   
DUMMY LABOUR INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES 0.099 0.064 
 (1.53) (0.77) 
DUMMY RESOURCE-BASED, LABOUR INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES 0.002 0.163 
 (0.01) (0.92) 
DUMMY FOOTLOOSE, CAPITAL INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES 0.061 0.004 
 (1.86)+ (0.08) 
YEAR DUMMY 1995 -2.499 0.000 
 (9.64)** (.) 
YEAR DUMMY 1996 -2.654 0.336 
 (10.90)** (3.49)** 
Constant 0.000 -3.394 
 (.) (10.28)** 
Observations 165 165 
R-squared 0.26 0.30 
Note: 1)  t-statistics in parentheses   
          2) Significance level: ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; + significant at 10%   
          a) The coefficients were multiplied by 103 to improve presentation.  
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This study employs an analysis based on the fixed-effect panel estimation 
approach.11
The results presented in Table 1 include all entry-barrier variables in one 
regression model.  At the experiment stage, there were three other sets of estimations 
which were done by including the entry-barrier variables one-by-one.
  This approach assures that a large portion of the unobserved variables is 
taken into account and hence we are more confident that the results are unbiased, 
although it perhaps  does not give satisfactory results in terms of statistical significance. 
Adopting this approach is particularly important because large variables representing 
entry and exit barriers can be unobserved or industry specific (Geroski 1991).  
12
Of the trade-related variables, 
  The results of 
these experiments did not give substantially different results compared to those 
presented in Table 1, and because the F statistics of the estimations in Table 1 are 
substantially higher than those drawn from the experimental estimations, the 
experimental estimations were not used for the discussion.  Partial correlations between 
the dependent and all independent variables are presented in Appendix 1. 
 
7.2.  The Structural Determinants of Entry  
 
7.2.1.  Entry 
1−tTARIFF  is positively related to entry and is 
statistically significant.  Therefore, trade protection seems to have attracted entry in this 
period.  However, this impact  cannot confidently be applied across all industries, 
because the estimated coefficient is only marginally statistically significant (i.e., at the 
10 per cent level).  This marginal importance is emphasised by a rather low correlation 
between the dependent variable and 1−tTARIFF , which is 0.29 (see Appendix 1). 
Meanwhile, the coefficient of 1−tIMP  shows a negative sign but is only moderately 
significant (i.e. significant at the 10 per cent level).  Thus, a higher extent of 
competition from imports seems to have discouraged entry during the period under the 
                                                 
11  This is different from other studies (e.g. Fotopoulus and Spence 1998) who based their analysis 
on results without inclusion of fixed industry effects. 
12  These experiments respond to the comment made by a participant of the workshop of this 
research project. 
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study.  This result is also consistent with an earlier finding by Anagnostaki and Louri 
(1995) that import penetration is negatively related to entry and exit.  
None of the entry barrier variables appears to explain entry.  The coefficient of all 
of these variables is statistically insignificant.  Moreover, while not significant, the 
coefficients are all positive, which contradicts the theoretical prediction.  
While it does not seem statistically to explain entry, it is worth discussing the result 
of 14 −tCR  as an entry barrier variable.  Its positive coefficient implies that seller 
concentration induced, rather than impeded, entry.  A possible explanation is that this 
finding supports the argument that concentrated industries provide a higher survival 
chance once entry has occurred.  This comment is further supported by the coefficient 
of 1−tKR  which also shows a positive correlation, although, again, it is not statistically 
significant. 
The coefficient of 1−tFOR  is negative, and statistically significant at the 10 per cent 
level.  Therefore, a high concentration of foreign ownership in an industry is expected to 
reduce the extent of entry.  This finding thus provides some support for the argument of 
the superiority of foreign firms in terms of economies of scale, which provides some 
insulation of these firms from potential entrants, through the ability of the firms to 
charge a competitive level of industry price by exercising their economies of scale. 
The result of 1−tEXP  is encouraging in terms of entry.  The coefficient of 1−tEXP  is 
positive and statistically significantly, although only at the 10 per cent level.  This 
finding reflects the descriptive analysis presented earlier on the rather clear positive 
impact of the declining tariff rate on industry export share, and to some extent on the 
trend of firm entry.  Supporting this even further, the partial correlation of this variable 
to the dependent variable is small, that is, 0.23 (see Appendix 1). 
The results on the dummy variables for industry groups, by their factor intensity, 
do not give satisfactory results.  The extent of entry in the labour-intensive industry 
group does not seem to have been high, compared to that in the resource-based capital-
intensive industry group which acts as the base-dummy variable. 
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7.2.2.  The Determinants of the Interdependence between Entry and Exit 
This section seeks evidence concerning the validity of the displacement-
replacement effect and the symmetry hypothesis implied by entry and exit determinants.  
The results provide some support for the symmetry hypothesis.  All entry barrier 
variables ( 1−tES , 1−tKR  and 14 −tCR ) show the same sign in both the entry and exit 
equations.  The estimated coefficients are similar across equations, indicating a similar 
effect from these variables in inducing or deterring entry and exit.  
It is worth noting that the process involved with the symmetry hypothesis is 
unlikely to be the same as the one originally hypothesised by Caves and Porter (1976). 
Instead of a discouraging effect, entry barriers seem to encourage both entry and exit at 
the same time.  Two of the entry barriers variables, 14 −tCR  and 1−tKR , show positive 
signs in both the entry and exit equations.  
It is worth mentioning here the large impact of seller concentration on exit, 
indicated by the strong estimate of the 14 −tCR  estimate.  This suggests an existence of 
collusive behaviour that warrants some profitable profit margin, based on the theory 
postulated by limit price model.  
Some support for the symmetry hypothesis is also displayed by the other variables. 
1−tIMP  appears to moderately prevent both entry and exit.  As argued by Fotopoulus and 
Spence (1997), one reason might be that expansion in markets with high import 
penetration is not enough to ensure new plant creation or capacity expansion at the 
minimum efficient scale while, at the same time, lack of expansion in the domestic 
market tends to sustain collusive behaviour among incumbents.  1−tEXP  is positively 
related to entry and exit.  This confirms earlier findings (e.g. Anagnostaki and Louri 
1995; Sleuwagen and Dehandschutter 1991) that the extent of the external market 
encourages both entry and exit in domestic industries.  While it seems to contradict a 
stylised fact from the micro exporting literature, which suggests that exit should have 
been lower in exporting industries – because firms in these industries tend to be more 
efficient than those in other industries –, the positive relationship on exit might occur if 
there was a co-existence of efficient and inefficient firms in the exporting industries 
(Anagnostaki and Louri, 1995).  According to Anagnostaki and Louri, inefficient  firms 
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are likely to be displaced by more efficient firms entering the industries, which are most 
likely be attracted by the profit opportunity provided by export markets. 
Despite these findings, the results do not strongly validate the symmetry 
hypothesis. 1−tEXP  is only statistically significant in the exit equation.  
The results provide some indications on displacement and replacement entry.  Both 
11 −tEN  and 11 −tEX  in the exit and entry equation respectively, are positive.  Moreover, 
the displacement effect is suggested to have been strong, indicated by a very high level 
of statistical significance of the 11 −tEN  and 11 −tEX  coefficient.  This inference is also 
supported by a strong correlation of these variables to their relevant dependent variables, 
as written in Appendix 1 (i.e., 0.35 and 0.36 for 11 −tEN  and 11 −tEX , respectively).  The 
estimated coefficient of 11 −tEX , which is about 2, suggests a rather large effect of 
replacement under a one year adjustment structure.   
 
7.2.3.  Estimation Results using the Alternative Entry and Exit Measure 
In the preceding analysis, entry and exit rates are measured in terms of the number 
of plants.  The equations in Model I are now re-estimated using entry and exit rates 
measured in terms of employment ( '2EN  and '2EX ) and output ( '3EN  and '3EX ) to 
provide robustness for the earlier findings.  The results are presented in Table 2 and 3, 
for the entry-exit rate in terms of employment and output, respectively.  The equations 
are estimated using the SURE method, as the LM tests conclude that the error terms in 
the entry and exit equations are correlated.  In terms of model fit, the results are 
generally satisfactory.  In the equations presented, the 2 'R s  do not deviate much from 
the ones in '1EN  and '1EX  equations and the F tests are significant at the 1 per cent or 
better level. 
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Table 2.  The Determinants of Entry and Exit, 1993-96: Regression Results of  
Model I with EN2' and EX2' as the Dependent Variable 
 Method: SURE 
Dependent variable EN2''j,t EX2''j,t 
 (1) (2) 
PCMj,t-1 -0.473   
 (0.56)   
SDPCMj,t-1 -0.571   
 (1.27)   
PCMj,t   -1.004 
   (1.19) 
ROOMj,t-1 0.139   
 (0.26)   
GRj,t   0.116 
   (0.90) 
ESj,t-1 a) 0.032 -0.041  
 (0.73) (0.87) 
KRj,t-1 a) -0.624    -0.023 
 (2.03)* (0.07) 
CR4j,t-1 -0.216 0.271 
 (0.54) (0.65) 
FORj,t-1 -0.278 0.097 
 (0.57) (0.18) 
EXPj,t-1 -0.354 0.782 
 (0.92) (1.83)+ 
IMPj,t-1 -0.028 -0.025 
 (2.04)* (1.65)+ 
TARIFFj,t-1 0.011 0.002 
 (0.95) (0.12) 
EN2j,t-1   1.525 
   (2.00)* 
EX2j,t-1 5.681   
 (3.56)**   
DUMMY LABOUR INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES 0.004 0.150 
 (0.04) (1.02) 
DUMMY RESOURCE-BASED, LABOUR INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES 0.103 0.208 
 (0.57) (0.67) 
DUMMY FOOTLOOSE, CAPITAL INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES 0.039 0.069 
 (0.79) (0.88) 
YEAR DUMMY 1995 -2.787 -4.153 
 (7.20)** (7.17)** 
YEAR DUMMY 1996 -2.914 -3.964 
 (8.01)** (7.12)** 
Constant 0.000 0.000 
  (.) (.) 
Observations 165 165 
R-squared 0.22 0.19 
Note:  1)  t-statistics in parentheses   
           2) Significance level: ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; + significant at 10%   
           a) The coefficients were multiplied by 103 to improve presentation.  
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Table 3.  The Determinants of Entry and Exit, 1993-96: Regression Results of  
Model I with EN3' and EX3' as the Dependent Variable 
 Method: SURE 
Dependent Variable EN3'j,t EX3'j,t 
 (1) (2) 
PCMj,t-1 -2.926   
 (2.19)*   
SDPCMj,t-1 -0.007   
 (0.01)   
PCMj,t   -2.915 
   (2.28)* 
ROOMj,t-1 -1.65   
 (1.92)+   
GRj,t   0.328 
   (1.38) 
ESj,t-1 a)  -0.034 -0.041  
 (0.48) (0.57) 
KRj,t-1 a) 0.202  0.091 
 (0.41) (0.18) 
CR4j,t-1 -1.938 -0.393 
 (3.04)** (0.63) 
FORj,t-1 0.339 -0.739 
 (0.44) (0.93) 
EXPj,t-1 -0.243 0.946 
 (0.40) (1.45) 
IMPj,t-1 -0.036 -0.033 
 (1.63) (1.44) 
TARIFFj,t-1 -0.006 0.018 
 (0.35) (0.83) 
EN3j,t-1   2.411 
   (2.09)* 
EX3j,t-1 4.125   
 (1.63)   
DUMMY LABOUR INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES 0.055 0.075 
 (0.36) (0.34) 
DUMMY RESOURCE-BASED, LABOUR INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES 0.481 -0.160 
 (1.66)+ (0.34) 
DUMMY FOOTLOOSE, CAPITAL INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES 0.124 0.079 
 (1.60) (0.66) 
YEAR DUMMY 1995 -1.761 0.000 
 (2.86)** (.) 
YEAR DUMMY 1996 -1.960 0.141 
 (3.39)** (0.55) 
Constant 0.000 -4.183 
 (.) (4.78)** 
Observations 164 164 
R-squared 0.18 0.23 
Note:  1)  t-statistics in parentheses   
           2) Significance level: ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; + significant at 10%   
           a) The coefficients were multiplied by 103 to improve presentation.  
44 
In general, some results from the estimations using the alternative entry-exit 
measures are different from the previous results, and hence one could claim that the 
earlier results are not really robust.  However, and as noted earlier, the results using 
entry rate in terms of number of plants (i.e., EN1 and EX1) should be given more weight 
for the basis of analysis.  This is theoretically justified since measures of market 
structure, which is one of the key determinants of entry, often stress the significance of 
the number of firms (Baldwin 1998, p.12). 
Nonetheless, it is useful to mention the key differences between the previous 
results and the results presented in Tables 2 and 3.  
Consider, first, the results of using the entry-exit rate in terms of employment.  The 
coefficient of 1−tKR is negative and very statistically significant (i.e., at the 1 % level). 
This suggests that the initially required capital, which determines other aspects of firm 
size at entry, seems to have been material in determining entry in terms of employment. 
The other difference is that the coefficient of 1−tEXP  is very disappointing, as is 1−tFOR . 
In particular, the coefficient of 1−tEXP  is negative, which contradicts the earlier finding. 
But, more importantly, the coefficient of these two variables is statistically insignificant, 
which suggest that foreign ownership and export share does not seem to have attracted 
entry at all in terms of employment. 
However, there are at least a few similar findings.  First, the coefficients of 
1−tTARIFF  and 1−tFOR  are in accordance with the results of using the entry-exit variable 
measured by the number of plants.  But these coefficients are statistically insignificant. 
Secondly, the same finding is also shown for the displacement and replacement effect.   
Moreover, the results based on employment entry-exit suggest that the replacement 
effect is very strong and large, since the coefficient of 12 −tEX  in the entry equation is 
very large, as well as highly statistically significant.  
Turning to the estimation results based on entry-exit in terms of output, the first 
difference is that there seems to have been a strong displacement effect, but very weak 
replacement effect, since the latter is not statistically significant.  14 −tCR  in the entry 
equation now has a negative coefficient and is highly statistically significant.  This 
indicates that much of the entry comprises many small firms in terms of output. 
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Meanwhile, 1−tEXP  and 1−tFOR  do not seem to have attracted entry when the entry is 
measured in terms of output.  The t-statistics are very low, implying very low statistical 
confidence for the relationship.  A disappointing result also applies to the key variables 
of the econometric exercise, which are the 1−tTARIFF  and 1−tIMP .  The most 
unsatisfactory result is for the coefficient of 1−tTARIFF , which is statistically 
insignificant. 
 
 
8.  Summary and Discussion 
 
This study examines the impact of major trade and investment reforms that took 
place in the 1980s and 1990s on the extent of plant entry in Indonesian manufacturing. 
The descriptive picture does not give a clear indication of the impact.  Specifically, 
while for some industry groups the generally declining pattern of trade protection seems 
to have been followed by some increase in the extent of plant entry over the period 
covered by this study, which is 1993-96, this does not seem to have been the case for 
other industry groups.  Industries that produce textile and garments, wood products, and 
paper products, for example, are those which recorded some increase in the plant entry 
rates, while the industries that produce machinery and transport equipment are those 
which evidently experienced lower plant entry rate over the time.  
An attempt to further assess the importance of the reforms with an econometric 
exercise somewhat helps the study to provide a general hypothesis on the impact of 
trade and investment liberalisation.  In particular, recalling the estimated coefficient of 
TARIFF, there is stronger guidance on the impact of the trade and investment 
liberalisation on the extent of firm entry in Indonesian manufacturing.  As noted, the 
descriptive analysis earlier in this study was not able to clearly define the direction of 
the impact (i.e., either positive or negative).  The results suggest that the trade and 
investment liberalisation occurring between the mid 1980s and the mid 1990s tended to 
deter entry.  Based on the theory, this further indicates that the industry became more 
competitive, in terms of lower motivation to collude, although this comes with a lower 
profit margin.  This message is consistent with the results that come from the import-
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penetration ratio which suggests a negative relationship between increased competition 
from import, and firm entry. 
Why was it that a more liberalised trade and investment regime  did not lead to 
higher plant entry?  As noted, this tends to conflict a conventional belief that the impact 
of such a regime would be positive.  While clearly more research needs to be done, 
there are at least possible explanations for this, which may have been specific only to 
the case of Indonesia, at least during the period covered by this study.  It could be the 
case that there was still a quite high level of trade protection during the period. The 
source of this high protection level is likely to have come from NTBs, owing to the fact 
that the nominal tariff rate declined substantially during the early 1990s.  In fact, as 
reviewed, there were still some NTBs that were implemented during the period, despite 
the major trade reforms occurring at the same time.  Moreover, as also reviewed, there 
were also some regulations that preserved a protective industrial policy.  
This explanation thus implies that the Indonesian experience does not necessary 
conflict with the common prediction of the positive impact of trade and investment 
liberalisation; that is, some protectionist policies and measures that still existed at that 
time caused the (predicted) positive impact of the liberalisation not to be fully realised.  
The explanation is also consistent with the finding from the estimation in regards to 
the interdependence between entry and exit.  As presented above, displacement entry 
does not seem to have been as large as the extent of replacement entry.  This implies 
that some inefficient plants were still able operate.  At the same time, it also suggests 
that the decline in tariff protection at that time was perhaps not able to induce the level 
of competitive pressure that brings about strong competition between firms.  Indeed, the 
revealed positive relationship between industry concentration and the entry level 
support this argument.  This itself suggests that non-competitive behaviour, such as 
collusive action, tended to exist.  
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EX2''j,t 0.33 0.73 0.40 1.00
EN3'j,t 0.39 0.11 0.75 0.33 1.00
EX3'j,t 0.28 0.55 0.36 0.81 0.36 1.00
PCMj,t-1 0.11 -0.07 -0.03 -0.07 -0.19 -0.22 1.00
ROOMj,t-1 -0.06 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.15 0.10 -0.03 1.00
SDPCMj,t-1 0.02 0.08 -0.11 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 0.13 0.10 1.00
ESj,t-1 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.09 0.01 -0.02 -0.19 -0.04 0.01 1.00
KRj,t-1 0.00 0.10 -0.16 -0.08 -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 -0.09 0.00 0.53 1.00
CR4j,t-1 0.12 0.21 0.02 0.09 -0.22 -0.04 0.19 0.14 -0.05 -0.06 0.15 1.00
FORj,t-1 0.04 0.04 -0.02 0.11 -0.12 -0.04 0.30 0.00 0.00 -0.13 -0.15 0.40 1.00
EXPj,t-1 0.23 0.26 -0.01 0.23 0.03 0.25 -0.13 -0.10 0.07 -0.04 -0.01 -0.14 0.20 1.00
IMPj,t-1 -0.22 -0.10 -0.20 -0.13 -0.10 -0.12 -0.07 0.06 -0.02 0.01 0.06 -0.11 -0.09 -0.10 1.00
TARIFFj,t-1 0.29 0.09 0.11 0.11 -0.01 0.19 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 0.10 0.44 -0.19 1.00
EX1j,t-1 0.36 0.27 0.34 0.30 0.09 0.27 0.08 0.08 -0.02 -0.11 0.02 0.32 0.07 0.16 -0.12 0.20 1.00
EN1j,t-1 0.41 0.35 0.22 0.29 0.01 0.22 0.05 0.25 -0.03 -0.06 -0.07 0.13 0.07 0.23 0.05 0.05 0.20 1.00
EX2j,t-1 0.15 0.11 0.25 0.18 0.04 0.19 -0.02 0.22 -0.09 -0.10 -0.05 0.21 0.01 0.06 -0.05 0.16 0.75 0.10 1.00
EN2j,t-1 0.29 0.21 0.39 0.32 0.20 0.29 -0.07 0.43 0.02 0.03 -0.10 0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.14 0.67 0.13 1.00
EX3j,t-1 0.03 0.09 0.23 0.18 0.14 0.21 -0.05 0.24 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 0.12 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.54 0.19 0.77 0.21 1.00
EN3j,t-1 0.06 0.01 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.19 -0.09 0.43 0.04 -0.02 -0.13 -0.06 -0.05 0.01 -0.02 -0.09 -0.01 0.29 0.07 0.58 0.10 1.00
DUMMY LABOUR INTENSIVE
IND. 0.12 0.11 -0.03 0.16 -0.06 0.12 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.00 -0.10 0.08 0.31 0.24 -0.02 0.17 0.06 0.11 0.07 0.00 0.02 -0.06 1.00
DUMMY RESOURCE-BASED,
LAB. INT. IND. -0.08 0.06 0.03 -0.01 0.13 0.01 -0.12 0.05 -0.07 -0.04 0.07 -0.20 -0.36 -0.08 0.00 -0.02 -0.08 -0.10 -0.07 0.04 -0.12 0.12 -0.34 1.00
DUMMY FOOTLOOSE,
CAPITAL INT. IND. 0.08 -0.07 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.19 0.03 -0.02 0.06 -0.09 0.23 0.15 -0.23 0.02 -0.21 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.10 0.04 -0.21 -0.28 1.00
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